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Abstract—This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor mea-
surement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks.
Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that
can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measure-
ment residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank
decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated
FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU
data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex
optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector.
The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the
IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric power system is monitored via an extensive
network of sensors in tandem with data processing algo-
rithms, i.e., an intelligent cyber layer, that enables continual
observation and control of the physical system. In the past
decade, phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been widely
deployed in the electric power system to directly measure the
bus voltages and phase angles. Due to its high sampling rate
and accuracy, PMU has the potential to play a significant role
in real-time power system state estimation (SE) [1], dynamic
security assessment [2], [3], system protection [4], and system
awareness [5].
In recent years, several incidents [6]–[9] have demonstrated
that the cyber layer of power system is vulnerable to cyber-
attacks that impact the system operation status and lead
to serious physical consequences. As increasingly important
monitoring devices, PMUs are also prone to cyber-attacks.
Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the vulnerability of PMUs
to potential cyber-attacks. In [10], [11], the authors study
the cyber-security of PMU-based SE and classify the poten-
tial cyber-attacks on PMUs as communication link damage
attacks, denial of service attacks, and data spoofing attacks
including GPS spoofing attacks and false data injection (FDI)
attacks.
In this paper, we focus on FDI attacks, wherein the attacker
replaces a subset of PMU measurements with counterfeits. The
most effective FDI attacks are those which are unobservable
to SE. It has been established in [12]–[15] that FDI attacks,
when designed appropriately, can be unobservable to both DC
SE and AC SE that use traditional SCADA measurements.
Such attacks can be designed to specifically have a financial
impact (e.g., on the electricity market such as in [16], [17]) or
worse yet a physical impact on the system (e.g., [18], [19]).
To thwart unobservable FDI attacks, several protection
mechanisms and attack detection approaches have been intro-
duced recently. In [20], Kim and Tong introduce an approach
to ensure system observability by placing secure PMUs so as
to protect the system from FDI attacks. However, since PMU
measurements can also be changed by attacker, this method
cannot eliminate FDI attacks when PMUs are compromised by
attackers. In [21], the authors propose a decentralized detection
scheme for FDI attacks based on the Markov graph of bus
phase angles. However, this method might not work well when
the system experiences a disturbance. In [22], Lee and Kundur
introduce a detector based on Expectation-Maximization to
detect FDI attacks in PMU measurements. This method needs
to be solved iteratively and the convergence rates are very slow
for real-time detection (e.g., 105 iterations) for even a small
test system.
Related Work: Recently, using measurements obtained from
deployed PMUs in the grid, [23] and [24] illustrate the low-
rank nature of PMU data. These approaches suggest that PMU
measurements can be modeled as a matrix to capture both the
temporal aspects (e.g., via the rows of the matrix) and the
spatial aspects (for each time instant via the columns).
Recently in [25]–[27], low-rank decomposition (LD) has
been proposed to detect FDI attacks on the electric power
system using a block of consecutive measurement data. On
the other hand, the FDI attacks of most interest are those
in which the attacker is not omniscient and omnipresent —
this limited knowledge and limited capabilities of FDI attacks
are often captured (see, for e.g., [12], [13], [18], [19], [28]–
[31]) by restricting attacker knowledge to a subset of the
network and restricting counterfeits to a small number of
meters, respectively. This latter restriction along with the
above mentioned low-rank properties of a block of PMU
data suggests that the resulting counterfeit PMU measurement
matrix can be viewed as a linear combination of a low-
rank (actual) measurement matrix and a sparse attack matrix
(counterfeit additions to measurement).
In [25], the authors propose a LD approach (introduced
in [32] for arbitrary sparse datasets), for temporal SCADA
data; specifically, they demonstrate that attacks designed with-
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out knowledge of the temporal correlations of the SCADA
measurements can be detected by solving an LD problem.
Furthermore, their model assumes that while the FDI attack
matrix is sparse in each time instant, the attacker attacks a
different set of measurements. While such a model is quite
general, for attacks designed with a specific effect (financial
or physical damage), sustaining attacks over time on the same
meters can have more impact. Focusing on such sustained
attacks, for PMU data, the authors of [26], [27] show that
an LD-based detector can identify column sparse FDI attack
matrix where the column sparsity is a result of the assumption
that the attacker attacks the same set of PMU measurements
over time.
Our Contributions: Following [26], [27] we model PMU
data as a low-rank matrix. Furthermore, focusing on impactful
FDI attacks, our attack model involves sustained attacks on
the same meters over time, i.e., column sparse attacks (using
the nomenclature that rows and columns indicate spatial and
temporal data, respectively). Although LD detector shows
good performance in detecting column sparse unobservable
FDI attacks on both synthetic data and some field PMU
data [26], [27], a question that needs to be addressed is the
following: if an attacker has knowledge of the time correlation
of the PMU data, can it take advantage of such knowledge and
design FDI attacks that can bypass the detector? In this paper,
we assume the attacker has the ability to predict the system
dynamics, and we introduce a new class of FDI attacks that
can bypass the LD detector. These attacks are designed with a
convex optimization problem. We prove that the LD detector
cannot identify the exact set of states that are modified by the
attacker. We demonstrate that such attacks are unobservable
for both traditional bad data detectors and the LD detector on
both the IEEE 24-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the models for the system, FDI
attacks, and the LD detector. Throughout, we assume there are
nb buses, nbr branches, ng generators, and nz measurements
in the system.
A. System Model
PMUs collect complex bus voltage and branch current
measurements. The reporting rate of the PMU measurements is
usually 30 times per second [33]. These measurements have a
linear relationship with the complex bus voltage states. At each
time instant t, the PMU measurement model can be written
as
zt = Hxt + et (1)
where at time instant t, zt is the nz × 1 measurement vector;
xt is the state vector of complex bus voltage; et is an nz × 1
noise vector assumed to be composed of independent Gaussian
random variables; the complex matrix H is the nz × nb de-
pendency matrix between measurements and states. Note that
the state can be estimated based on PMU measurements via
a single weighted least squares (WLS) [33], unlike traditional
SCADA-based SE which requires multiple iterations due to
the nonlinearity of the measurement function [34].
One possible way to process PMU data is to collect over a
block of time (e.g., 5 to 20 seconds) and then process them
as a batch (see for example [35]). We adopt this approach
and write the PMU measurements as a matrix where each
row vector corresponds to PMU measurements at one time
instant and each column vector consists of the measurements
collected in the same channel over a period of times. The
PMU measurements in (1) over N time instants can then be
collected as
Z = XHT + E (2)
where matrices Z =
[
zT1 ; z
T
2 ; . . . ; z
T
N
]
, X =[
xT1 ; x
T
2 ; . . . ;x
T
N
]
, and E =
[
eT1 ; e
T
2 ; . . . ; e
T
N
]
are PMU
measurement matrix, state matrix, and noise matrix,
respectively. Note that zTt , x
T
t , and e
T
t for t = 1, 2, . . . , N are
the transpose of the measurement, state, and noise column
vectors, respectively, in (1).
B. Unobservable FDI Attack Model
Assume the attacker has control of the measurements in a
subset S of the network, denoted as the attack subgraph. As
in [18], we first distinguish between two types of buses in the
network: load buses that have load directly connected to them,
and non-load buses with no load. We assume S is bounded by
load buses. The set of measurements in S are denoted as J . In
the absence of noise, an attack is defined to be unobservable
if
Z¯ = Z +D = Z + CHT = (X + C)HT + E (3)
where Z¯ is the N × nz post-attack measurement matrix,
D is the N × nz attacked measurements matrix such that
D = CHT , and C is the N × nb attack matrix. In the
following, we define the set of non-zero columns in a matrix as
its column support, written as supp (·). Note that the attacker
is constrained to inject false data only in the measurements in
J . Thus, D is a column sparse matrix where supp (D) ⊆ J .
One natural way to form a column spare D is to choose a
column sparse C.
Prior work [12], [13], [18], [19], [28]–[30] considers a
special case of (3) with only one time instant, i.e., N = 1.
These works show that traditional bad data detectors based on
measurement residuals cannot detect such FDI attacks.
C. Prior Work: Attack Detection Based on Low-Rank Matrix
Decomposition
Traditional bad data detectors based on measurement resid-
uals cannot detect the FDI attacks introduced in (3). However,
exploiting the low-rank nature of the high-dimensional PMU
data matrix Z, the authors in [26] propose a new attack
detection mechanism based on LD so as to separate the low-
rank matrix Z and column sparse matrix CHT in (3). We
now briefly review their attack assumptions and detection
methodology.
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Given a measurement matrix Z¯(LD), the measurement matrix
without attack, Z(LD), and the attack matrix C(LD) can be iden-
tified by solving the following convex optimization problem:
minimize
Z(LD)∈CN×nz ,CLD∈CN×nb
‖Z(LD)‖∗ + λ‖C(LD)‖1,2 (4)
subject to Z¯(LD) = Z(LD) + C(LD)H¯T (5)
where ‖Z(LD)‖∗ is the nuclear norm of Z(LD); ‖C(LD)‖1,2 is
the l1,2-norm of C(LD), i.e., the sum of l2-norm of columns
in C(LD); λ is a weight factor; and H¯ is the normalized
dependency matrix, where for each row vector Hi, H¯i =
Hi/‖Hi‖. The objective (4) is to minimize the rank of Z∗(LD)
(captured by its nuclear norm) and the column sparsity of
C∗(LD) (captured by its l1,2-norm).
After obtaining the optimal solution,
(
Z∗(LD), C∗(LD)
)
for (4)–(5), the set of attacked measurements and states,
supp
(
C∗(LD)H¯T
)
and supp
(
C(∗LD)
)
, respectively, can be
identified as the column support of C∗(LD)H¯T and C∗(LD).
Assume there exists unobservable attacks in Z¯(LD), such that
Z¯(LD) = Z+CH¯T . The authors prove that for a specific range
of λ, i.e., λ ∈ [λmin, λmax], the optimization in (4) can suc-
cessfully identify supp(C), i.e., supp
(
C∗(LD)
)
= supp (C),
under the assumption that every nonzero column of CH¯T does
not lie in the column space of Z.
III. FDI ATTACK EXPLOITING LOW-RANK PROPERTY OF
PMU MEASUREMENT MATRIX
In this section, we introduce a class of FDI attacks that
cannot be detected by the LD detector in (4)–(5). We assume
that the attacker has the following knowledge and capabilities:
1) The attacker has full system topology information.
2) The attacker can perfectly predict the measurements in
the following N instances and has the capability to
estimate the predicted states.
3) The attacker has control of the measurements in a subset
S of the network.
Given a PMU measurement matrix Z and the potential
attacked states set I, we propose the following optimization
problem to design FDI attacks:
minimize
C∈CN×nb
‖Z + CH¯T ‖∗ (6)
subject to supp(C) ⊆ I (7)
where ‖·‖∗ denotes the nuclear norm. For optimal solution
C∗, the optimal post-attack measurement matrix denoted as
Z¯∗ can be written as
Z¯∗ = Z + C∗H¯T . (8)
The goal of the attacker is to ensure that the attacked measure-
ment matrix Z¯∗ is low-rank when Z is low-rank. This can be
approximated by minimizing the nuclear norm of Z¯∗ as (6).
Constraint (7) ensures that the attacker can only attack states
in I, i.e., C∗ is a column sparse matrix.
In the following, we prove that either Z¯∗ bypasses the LD
detector (i.e., results in C∗(LD) = 0), or the LD detector
identifies at least one measurement as corrupted that is not.
Theorem 1. Assume the attack-free measurement matrix
Z can bypass the LD detector, i.e., for Z¯(LD) = Z,(
Z∗(LD), C∗(LD)
)
= (Z,0). Assume the solution C∗ of (6)–(7)
is non-zero. Then using Z¯∗ in the LD detector, the resulting
C∗(LD) satisfies that either C∗(LD) = 0, or supp
(
C∗(LD)
) 6⊆
supp (C∗).
Proof. First, we prove that for a given Z, ‖Z¯∗‖∗ ≤ ‖Z‖∗. For
a given Z, C = 0 is always a feasible solution for (6)–(7). For
C = 0, the objective ‖Z¯‖∗ = ‖Z + CH¯T ‖∗ = ‖Z‖∗. Since
we minimize (6), the objective of C∗ is less than or equal to
that of the feasible solution 0. That is, ‖Z¯∗‖∗ ≤ ‖Z‖∗ always
holds.
Suppose Z can bypass LD detector. That is, for input
Z¯(LD) = Z,
(
Z∗(LD), C∗(LD)
)
= (Z,0). As we just proved
‖Z + C∗H¯T ‖∗ = ‖Z¯∗‖∗ ≤ ‖Z‖∗ = ‖Z∗(LD)‖∗. (9)
Thus,
‖Z + C∗H¯T ‖∗ ≤ ‖Z‖∗ ≤ ‖Z‖∗ + λ‖C∗‖1,2. (10)
Let C∗(LD) be the optimal solution of the LD detector for
Z¯(LD) = Z¯∗. The objective (4) for Z¯∗ satisfies
‖Z¯∗−C∗(LD)H¯T ‖∗+λ‖C∗(LD)‖1,2 ≤ ‖Z¯∗‖∗ ≤ ‖Z‖∗. (11)
Note that ‖Z¯∗ − C∗(LD)H¯T ‖∗ can be rewritten as ‖Z +(
C∗ − C∗(LD)) H¯T ‖∗.
If supp
(
C∗(LD)
) ⊆ I, then
‖Z +
(
C∗ − C∗(LD)
)
H¯T ‖∗ ≥ ‖Z + C∗H¯T ‖∗ (12)
since C∗ is the optimal solution for (6)–(7). That is, Z¯∗ and
C∗(LD) satisfy
‖Z¯∗ − C∗(LD)H¯T ‖∗ + λ‖C∗(LD)‖1,2 ≥ ‖Z¯∗‖∗. (13)
Therefore, the only solution that can satisfy both (11) and (13)
is C∗(LD) = 0.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate the efficacy of the unobservable
FDI attacks introduced in Sec. III. To this end, we first solve
the attack optimization problem in (6)–(7) to find the optimal
attack matrix C∗. Subsequently, we construct the post-attack
measurement matrix Z¯∗ with C∗ as (8). Finally, we solve
the LD detection optimization problem (4)–(5) for Z¯∗ to
check if the attack matrix C∗ is detected. Throughout, we
assume that the LD detector selects 2 seconds worth of PMU
measurements data, i.e., N = 60, while the attacker injects
bad data. The test systems include the IEEE 24-bus reliability
test system (RTS) and IEEE 118-bus system. The convex
optimization problems for LD detection and attack design
are solved with MOSEK. In the LD detection optimization
problem, the weight λ is chosen to be 1.05 for both the IEEE
24-bus and the IEEE 118-bus systems.
We assume both test systems are fully observable with
PMU measurements. This is achieved by solving an optimal
PMU placement problem as introduced in [36]. The details of
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Fig. 1. Current magnitudes of the synthetic PMU data.
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Fig. 2. Singular values of the synthetic PMU data matrix in decreasing order.
the PMU locations and measurements for both test systems
are summarized in Table II. In [26], the authors demonstrate
an actual PMU dataset, which we do not have access to.
Therefore, to make a fair comparison, we generate synthetic
PMU data over 5 seconds in each test system. To model
realistic data with a disturbance, at the first time instant t after
1 second, we change the load at each bus by adding a random
value d to the base load, such that d ∼ N (0, 60
1.1(t−31)
)
. We
then solve an AC power flow to obtain the measured phasors of
bus voltage and branch current as measurements at time instant
t. The resulting synthetic measurements for the IEEE 24-bus
system and the IEEE 118-bus system are partially illustrated
in Fig 1. The singular values for the synthetic measurement
matrices for the IEEE 24-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus
system are illustrated in Fig 2. It can be seen that these
synthetic measurements have the same low-rank property as
the actual PMU data as illustrated in [26]. The synthetic data is
then broken into two parts for testing, one for t =1–3 seconds,
the other for t =3–5 seconds. Observe that the measurement
matrix for t=1–3 seconds has more disturbances than that for
t=3–5. Furthermore, we assume noiseless measurements, i.e.,
E = 0 in (3).
We exhaustively generate the unobservable attacks with all
potential attacked state sets I for which 1 ≤ |I| ≤ 5 in the
IEEE 24-bus system; for tractability we consider only |I| = 1
in the IEEE 118-bus system. Specifically, as observed in our
TABLE I
STATISTIC RESULTS OF ‖Z¯∗‖∗ IN THE IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM.
Time
Period
‖Z¯∗‖ ‖Z‖
Min Max Ave
1–3 second 116.1 116.7 116.5 116.8
3–5 second 56.9 57.1 57.0 57.1
1 2 3 4 572
73
74
75
76
77
(a) Statistic results of the post−attack measurement matrix for t=1−3 s
Minimum Maximum Average ||Z||*
1 2 3 4 559
59.5
60
60.5
61
Number of Attacked States
(b) Statistic results of the post−attack measurement matrix for t=3−5 s
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Fig. 3. Statistic results of ‖Z¯∗‖∗ in the IEEE 24-bus system.
prior work [18], [19], unobservable attacks must be designed
inside a subgraph S which is bounded by load buses. In S , the
states of all the non-bounded buses (including load and non-
load buses) have to be changed. In this paper, the attacked
state sets I are selected according to this rule.
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Fig. 4. Magnitude of the from side current measurement on line 12 in the
IEEE 24-bus system with I = {8}.
For every attack we tested, the LD detector is completely
bypassed, i.e., C∗(LD) = 0. We summarize the statistic results
including maximum, minimum, and average values of ‖Z¯∗‖∗
for the IEEE 24-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system in
Fig. 3 and Table I, respectively. From these results, it can be
seen that for every attack we tested, ‖Z¯∗‖∗ ≤ ‖Z‖∗ always
holds. In addition, in Fig. 3, we also find that for the IEEE
24-bus system, ‖Z¯∗‖∗ gradually decreases as the number of
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attacked state increases.
We now illustrate a typical case in the IEEE 24-bus system
in with I = {8}. In Fig. 4, the magnitudes of the from side
current measurement on line 12 are demonstrated, before and
after attack. From this case, we can see that the designed
attack accurately captures the temporal correlation of the PMU
measurements.
These observations are consistent with Theorem 1. In fact,
they are stronger than Theorem 1 since we did not find
any case where the LD detector results in C∗(LD) such that
C∗(LD) 6= 0 and supp (C∗(LD)) 6⊆ I.
TABLE II
MONITORED PMU MEASUREMENTS IN BOTH THE IEEE 24-BUS SYSTEM
AND THE IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM.
IE
E
E
24
-b
us
Sy
st
em Voltage
(Buses with
PMU)
1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 20
Current
(From Side)
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25,
26, 27, 30, 31, 36, 37
Current (To
Side)
1, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 34, 35
IE
E
E
11
8-
bu
s
Sy
st
em
Voltage
(Buses with
PMU)
2, 5, 10, 12, 15, 17, 21, 25, 29, 34, 37, 41, 45,
49, 53, 56, 62, 64, 72, 73, 75, 77, 80, 85, 87, 91,
94, 101, 105, 110, 114, 116
Current
(From Side)
5, 11, 13, 17, 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, 33, 39, 40, 44,
49, 50, 52, 53, 58, 60, 62, 68, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76,
80, 82, 85, 86, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 106, 120,
121, 123, 124, 128, 133, 135, 136, 143, 147, 148,
150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 162, 169, 170, 171, 176,
177, 178, 182, 184, 185
Current (To
Side)
1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 27,
31, 32, 35, 36, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 56, 61, 65, 66,
67, 68, 69, 73, 78, 79, 91, 92, 94, 111, 112, 113,
115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127,
131, 132, 134, 140, 145, 146, 160, 166, 168, 174,
175, 180, 183
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have studied the vulnerability of phasor
measurement units to FDI attacks. Prior work demonstrated
that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional
bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be
identified by the LD detector. In this work, we have shown that
a more sophisticated attacker that understands the temporal
correlation of PMU data can exploit it to design unobservable
FDI attacks that cannot be detected by the LD detector. Future
work involves developing countermeasures for such attacks.
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